CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
In this, the second biennial report of the Cree-Naskapi Commission, we review implementation of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act1 since our last report to Parliament in March, 1987.
In our last report, we noted the significance of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act as a milestone for Indian self-government2. The Act is the first comprehensive attempt to realize Indian aspirations of political autonomy at the community level. The Act and the two agreements which gave rise to it create a new political relationship between the Cree and Naskapi on the one hand and the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec on the other.
With the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, the Cree, the Naskapi and the Government of Canada accepted the challenge of liberating aboriginal people from the Indian Act as a basis of local administration. The demands of this challenge were clearly described by Chief Ted Moses of the Eastmain Band to the Cree-Naskapi Commission's 1988 Special Hearings on Implementation of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act:
Self-Government is the will of the people to take charge of their own destiny and manage the affairs of their society in order that they may prosper in a safe and healthy environment now and in the future. It requires from the people, confidence, commitment and hope in a better future. To those charged with making it work, it requires all of that plus dedication and perseverance. To those charged with assisting in its development, particularly its main sponsor, the federal government, it requires understanding, support and diplomacy. It has to do with people and their aspirations.3
This challenge is not an easy one. It is made more difficult by the necessarily complex nature of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act and of the issues to which it gives rise. It requires a commitment of resources as well as goodwill. It is, however, a challenge of great importance. It has implications not just for the Cree and the Naskapi, but for all of Canada's aboriginal people.
Because the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act carries important implications for Canada's aboriginal people, a fair and objective assessment of it is crucial. Judging the Act both in terms of the provisions it contains and in terms of how it has been implemented is very difficult. Providing such an assessment is not within the mandate of this Commission and therefore not the purpose of this report. Our purpose here is to report factually on implementation of the Act: to describe the measures that have been taken, to analyze the difficulties that have been encountered, and to make recommendations as to how implementation can be made more effective. By this process of describing, clarifying andmonitoring, we seek to provide a basis so that those who must judge the Act can do so in a more informed and reasoned way.
THE NATURE OF THE CREE-NASKAPI (OF QUEBEC) ACT
The Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act is the outcome of two agreements, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement4 and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement5. According to these two agreements6, the purpose of the Act is to provide an orderly and efficient system of self-government for the Cree and Naskapi communities within specified geographical territories and legal parameters.
As one might expect, the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act is complex. Its complexities, however, go beyond its more than 200 sections of wide ranging subject matter. They extend to its constitutional nature, the legal concepts it embodies and its tripartite governmental structure. Identifying these features is important to any appreciation of the Act and to an understanding of why its implementation has not been easy.
The Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act can be seen as the local constitution of the eight Cree communities and one Naskapi community to which it applies. As such, it designates the bands as the principal entities to which all other matters pertain7. It then goes on to establish the elements of self-government: legislatures and executives8, the electoral process for choosing legislators and leaders9, and the scope of local lawmaking authorityl0. It also determines that the Act and laws passed under it take precedence over any conflicting federal or provincial laws11.
A legal concept key to the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act is that of a corporate entity. In Canadian law, a corporation is an entity which is distinct and separate from those who create it. Thus, the Federal Parliament through the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act establishes the Cree communities and the Naskapi community as corporate entities12 over and above their members' legal existences as individual persons. It also determines many of their corporate features, it outlines the conditions of band membership13, the objects of bands14
and their powers, rights and privileges as natural persons15. The Act provides for the administration of each band corporation: it establishes head offices16, band councils and chief executive officers. It outlines the conduct of council meetings. The Act also deals with numerous other corporation type matters: the rules and regulations governing elections, annual meetings and special meetings; the engagement of agents, officers and employees of the band; as well as financial
administration, audits and borrowing powers17.
A second legal concept key to the Act is that of rights. The Act determines rights of various types. Some are group rights such as those governing the use and benefit of lands for the community as a whole18 or a band's interest in minerals and resources19. Others are individual rights such as the right to vote20 or rightsof residence21. Some rights, such as those pertaining to successions, flow from traditions or customary law22; others, such as those dealing with taxation and seizures, are established by legislation23.
Finally, there is the tripartite governmental structure of the Act. Three levels of government are recognized in the Act and each plays a critical role in its implementation. The Cree and Naskapi governments are the principal regimes to which the Act is directed. But the provincial and federal governments also bear key responsibilities and obligations. For each level of government, the Act presents special difficulties. For the Cree and the Naskapi, adapting to the Act's legal principles and concepts is obviously an involved process. The federal and provincial governments, on the other hand, must accommodate Cree and Naskapi customs, traditions and history which are barely mentioned in the Act. Further complicating the interaction of the three levels of government are the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement. These agreements contain many measures which have a direct bearing on the implementation of the Act. They are at the centre of a number of disputes which have
arisen between the Cree and the Naskapi and the federal government.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CREE-NASKAPI (OF QUEBEC) ACT
Because it is the first self-government legislation in Canada, the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act has important implications for other aboriginal peoples who wish to exercise self-government. Some of these implications are legal. Interpretations of the Act create important precedents as, for example, in legal cases where the powers of the Cree and Naskapi governments are pitted against the rights of individuals. Similarly, questions concerning application to the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act of section 35, the treaty and aboriginal rights provision, of the Constitution Act, 1982, have great significance. Other implications relate to matters such as financing or the scope of local governmental powers.
The most far reaching implication of the Act, however, is the success of its implementation: the degree to which self-government along the lines of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act can work. On the basis of implementation to date, two points are obvious.
The first is that implementation of self-government can be marred by public disputes and skirmishes. Unfortunately, this is the case with implementation of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act. Both the federal government and the Crees have been intent on winning public support for their positions. The federal government, especially, has been aggressive in promoting its position. At times, it appears that federal officials spend more time devising the public relations strategies than they do dealing with the substantive issues. Naturally, the Cree respond by vigorously promoting their position. The result has been strained relations between the parties and a public concerned about the process of implementing land claims agreements. Certainly, such difficulties in implementation discourage other people across Canada in their work on the development of self-government.
The second is that self-government is a costly venture. In preparing our report, we were constantly made aware of the financial resources needed by the Cree and the Naskapi to establish viable, self-governing communities. Housing, roads, water, sewage, administration buildings and equipment, a land registry system, court facilities and police, salaries and training for personnel are all very costly. For most Canadians, these necessities are already in place and funding for their continuation is secure. For the Cree and the Naskapi, and for other aboriginal people, this is not the case. Clearly, a first consideration of any self-government arrangement must be securing the financial resources to pay for it. For some aboriginal peoples, this will be a practical matter; for others it will be a matter of treaty or aboriginal rights.
COMPENSATION MONIES
Of concern to the Commission, in this context, is a widely held misconception that the Cree and Naskapi should pay for these needs using the compensation monies they received under the two Agreements. Suggestions that the "Cree are rich" or that "the Naskapi have money" and that public funding of their activities should be curtailed are ill-founded and must be answered. The compensation monies paid to the Cree and the Naskapi nations were for granting permission to construct one massive hydro-electric project on their territory. The Cree and Naskapi did not give up their entitlement to the benefits received by all Canadians, by all Quebecers or by other Indians. This point is seldom made.
To restore perspective to discussions of Cree and Naskapi entitlement to government programs, we outline as an example the arrangements for those compensation monies transferred to the Cree under the Agreements.
The Cree and Inuit signed the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement with federal and provincial governments and with provincial crown corporations. As payment for the use of their lands to build the massive James Bay Hydro-Electric Development Project and for the disruption caused to their traditional way of life, the Cree and Inuit received $225 million. In addition, they received recognition of hunting, fishing and trapping rights, a land regime, self-government and a range of other rights relating to matters such as education and health.
Because there were a number of signatories to the Agreement, it was necessary to outline prior to the signing precisely who would be responsible for paying the $225 Million, how the money would be divided between the Cree and the Inuit and when payments would be made.
Overall, the Cree share of the $225 Million is $136,625,450. This money is payable over twenty years in accordance with schedules set out in the Agreement. As of March 31,1988, the Cree have received $106,988,756. As for who makes payments, the $225 million is divided into three equal parts:
- The first $75 Million is paid jointly by the governments of Quebec and Canada. Of this amount, Canada pays 43.667%, or $32,750,000. The Cree share of the first $75 million is $44,605,225. Of this amount, Canada is required to pay the Cree $19,477,764 over a period of ten years. This has been paid so that Canada has fulfilled that part of its obligations.
- The second $75 Million is paid by the James Bay Energy Corporation. The Cree share is $44,605,225. This amount is paid based on the installed generating capacity of hydro-electric generating stations built in the territory north of the 49th parallel. The total amount is to be paid over a period ending on December 31, 1996.
- The third $75 Million is paid by the Government of Quebec. The Cree share is $44,605,225. These amounts are to be paid over a four year period by the Province of Quebec debentures in the years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979. These mature in twenty years from November 1, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979 respectively.
The management and investment of this money is prescribed by provincial legislation, an Act Respecting the Cree Regional Authority24. Under this act, a Board of Compensation exercises all rights and powers of the Cree Regional Authority for that portion of the compensation moneys received by the Cree.
The Board of Compensation was composed of twenty-two members. Up to October 31, 1987, two members were appointed by the Government of Quebec and one member was appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
A number of restrictions are placed on the use of the compensation money. Of the compensation received, pursuant to section 25.1, 75% must be invested in bonds, debentures or other forms of securities until October 31, 1987. This percentage declines to 50% from November 1, 1987 to October 31, 1997. Furthermore, compensation money must be used for the benefit of the Cree community as a whole and not for the personal benefit of individual Cree beneficiaries. Audited financial statements must be filed annually with the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for the first twenty fiscal years of the Cree Regional Authority.
Of the compensation money received to date, the Cree have discretion to disburse only twenty-five percent. In practice, they have reinvested 100% of the capital and used only the interest for disbursements. This is made clear in the financial statements of the Cree Regional Authority filed with the Minister25. The Cree recognize that it is essential to place limits on expenditures so that the capital portion of the compensation fund is not jeopardized. For this reason, the Board of Compensation has established, through by-law, a policy outlining procedures for disbursement of a percentage of the interest earned from the compensation monies26.
More recently, the La Grande (1986) Agreement, signed between the Cree and Hydro Quebec, allows Hydro-Quebec to construct and operate additions to the Complexe La Grande (1975) Project. These additions include the La Grande I Project (1986), the La Grande 2A Project, the Brisay Project and the RND (Radisson - Nicolet - Des Cantons Direct Current Transmission Line) Project. As compensation for the impact these additions will have on the Cree bands and the Cree way of life, Hydro-Quebec has agreed to pay $110 Million to the Cree. A separate amount of $2 Million was paid to the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) for costs incurred during negotiations.
Payment under the La Grande Agreement is made in two forms: $95 Million in two series of Hydro Quebec bonds, which mature in 1996 and 2006, and $15 Million in cash. The $15 Million cash is to be paid on the date that Hydro-Quebec awards a contract for work on the RND and LG 2A projects or thirty days after Certificates of Authorization for the two projects have been issued under the Environmental Quality Act27. The La Grande (1986) Agreement provides for creation of the James Bay Eeyou Corporation to manage the funds set out in the agreement and to make disbursements according to a Cree Inter-Band Treaty28. The James Bay Eeyou Corporation has adopted a disbursement policy to manage the compensation money received under the agreement.
In considering the monies transferred to the Cree under these agreements, it is important to note that according to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, and according to the preamble to the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act,29 the Cree continue to be entitled to the rights and benefits of all other citizens and of all other Indians of Canada. In recent years, the Board of Compensation has made numerous financial contributions in areas such as housing and infrastructure, community development, socio-economic development and has supported local and regional organizations. Cree financial statements clearly demonstrate that compensation money has been used to meet what the Cree regard as obligations of the Government of Canada.
MANDATE OF THE CREE-NASKAPI COMMISSION
The Cree-Naskapi Commission was established by the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act as an independent body to monitor the implementation of self-government under the Act30. The Commission is the first such body in Canada. With some pride, the Commission believes that it has demonstrated modest successes in carrying out its task. But it has also been impeded in its work by its own limitations. These limitations arise largely from the fact that its mandate is restricted to matters enumerated in the Act. Indeed, this mandate so limits the Commission that it cannot examine issuesdirectly related to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement, except to the extent that they are related to the implementation of the Act. This limited mandate diminishes the Commission's effectiveness.
Issues of health and education are a case in point. Because health and education are dealt with under the Agreements and under provincial legislation and are not addressed in the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, the Commission cannot deal with them. According to Chief Walter Hughboy of the Wemindji Band, there have been instances where problems concerning the jurisdictions and responsibilities of Cree bands and the Cree Health Board could have benefitted from examination by the Commission3l. Similarly, the Cree School Board in its report to the Special Implementation Hearings asked the Commission "to ensure that performance of obligations by Canada for education services are carried out...."32 Because education is not addressed in the Act, the Commission has been unable to respond in these situations.
The Commission believes there is evidence to warrant both an extended term and an expanded mandate for its work. This was a common theme in every presentation to the 1988 Special Implementation Hearings. The Grand Chief of the Cree, Matthew Coon-Come, stated:
We would like to see the Commission take a more vigorous role in the implementation of self-government. As a neutral body, with the ability to walk in both camps, the Commission is unique in being in the position to facilitate contact between the Crees and both the provincial and federal governments.33
Speaking of an extended term for the Commission, Chief Walter Hughboy of the Wemindji Band stated that a Commission which holds the Cree councils accountable may be needed for the next decade. Such a Commission, he said, could provide guidance and act as an ombudsman on Cree affairs.34 Chief Henry Mianscum of the Mistissini Band35 and Chief Abel Kitchen of the Waswanipi Band also called for an extension beyond the five years provided in the Act. Chief Kitchen said: "I wanted to state for the record that it is my hope that this forum will continue for the immediate future, in light of all the unresolved issues relating to the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act."36
Calls for an expanded mandate for the Commission included that of Chief Ted Moses of Eastmain who asked that the Commission's mandate be expanded to include both the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the relationship between the federal and Cree governments. He pointed out that "the James Bay Agreement has many fundamental aspects of self-government that are not necessarily written in the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act."37 Chief Mianscum of the Mistissini Band stated: "We also would like to see the Commission be mandated to review the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. As you know, probably 70% of that Agreement hasn't been implemented."38 John Mameamskum of the Naskapi Band praised the Commission for the way it has utilized its investigative powers. He also favoured "a wider mandate for the Commission under the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act so that it could take up its own investigations and issue reports which could facilitate the implementation of the Act and bring about improvements to it."39 Other calls for change were more sweeping. Philip Awashish of the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) asked that the mandate include all matters directly affecting self-government such as education, health and social services. "They are cornerstones to self-government and self-determination and are essential parts of the regime established by the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and support the principles of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act."40
Presenters also recommended an expansion of the Commission's reporting procedures and powers. Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come called for the Commission to report to a Standing Committee of the House of Commons. Parliament should refer the Commission's biennial report to a Standing Committee, he said, and the Commissioners should be invited before that Committee to answer questions on it.41 Philip Awashish said:
We see that, if the report of the Commission can be forwarded to a Standing Committee for review or presentation, the Commission itself certainly should have a role in it. We don't particularly see the Commission reporting to a Standing Committee itself, as it reports to Parliament, but the Parliament itself must be able to deal with all its report more effectively through Standing Committees. We certainly do hope that the Standing Committee will consider in the future reports from the Commission because we are disappointed in the manner that the report itself was dealt with through the whole Parliamentary process.42
Finally, Chief Billy Diamond of Waskaganish asked that the Commission mandate and powers be expanded to include the power to call witnesses. "The Commission should have the authority to call witnesses and should have the authority to subpoena documentation from various departments involved in the implementation of the Cree-Naskapi Legislation."43
The Cree-Naskapi Commission itself has no reluctance in assuming an expanded role to help facilitate the task of implementation of the Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act. The Commission feels that its restricted monitoring and reporting mandate does not allow it to take a more active and useful role in promoting implementation. That the Commission can be effective in such an expanded capacity has been demonstrated by recent events. In March, 1988, at the request of the Honourable William McKnight, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and Cree Grand Chief, Matthew Coon-Come, the Chairman of the Cree-Naskapi Commission, Mr. Justice Rejean F. Paul, supported by Cree-Naskapi Commission staff, served as an interimmediator in the negotiations over a number of difficult issues concerning a question of Cree beneficiaries, the funding of past capital, and operations and maintenance costs, and the instatement of the Ouje-Bougoumou Cree as a band under the Act. The success of these negotiations supports the view that the Commission can take a much more active role in securing a satisfactory implementation of the Act.